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794 PEOPLE v. BRADDOCK [41 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 5513. In Bank. Dec. 18, 1953.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. RAYMOND M. BRADDOCK, 
Appellant. 
[1) Indictment and Information-Charging Offense.-An informa-
tion is formally sufficient if, in substance, it charges de-
fendant with commission of a public offense in words sufficient 
to give him notice of the offense of which he is accused. (Pen. 
Code, § 952.) 
[2) Id.-Proof and Variance.-To be material, a variance between 
information and proof must be of such a substantive character 
as to mislead the accused in preparing his defense or likely to 
place him in second jeopardy for same offense. 
[3) Poisons-Offenses-Indictment and Information-Variance.-
No material variance exists between information charging 
doctor with having prescribed narcotics to a certain man and 
evidence that prescriptions were made out to such man's wife, 
a fictitious person, where true identity of man as narcotic 
officer was made known to doctor, who was present when 
officer testified at preliminary hearing; where that testimony 
included in detail the circumstances surrounding writing of 
prescriptions, with dates and places of those events and names 
used, and was sufficient to notify doctor of particular circum-
stances of offense charged in information; and where doctor 
could not have been misled in view of fact that by stipula-
tion the evidence against him was presented by transcript of 
proceedings on preliminary hearing with only a slight amount 
of additional testimony. 
[4) Criminal Law-Plea-Jeopardy-Evidence.-On a plea of 
double jeopardy, extrinsic evidence is admissible on trial to 
identify crime of which defendant has been convicted. 
[5] Poisons- Offenses- Prescribing Narcotics for Persons not 
Under Doctor's Treatment.-While it is questionable whether 
an accused properly may be convicted of a violation of Health 
& Sa£. Code, § 11165, prohibiting issuance of false or fictitious 
prescriptions, when evidence does not show that he knew or 
should have known that person for whom prescription was 
written was nonexistent, such act, even if punishable under 
that section, may also amount to a violation of § 11163, for-
bidding a doctor from prescribing narcotics for one not under 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Indictment and Information, § 72 et seq.; Am. 
Jur., Indictment and Information, § 176 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1 J Indictment and Information, § 28; 
[2] Indictment and Information,§ 110; [3] Poisons,§ 12; [4] Crim-
inal Law, § 198; [5-7] Poisons, § 9; [8-12] Criminal Law, § 50. 
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his treatment, since to hold otherwise would permit a physician 
freely supplying narcotics for illegitimate purposes to avoid 
being convicted of a felony by simple device of writing pre-
scriptions for a fictitious person. 
[6] !d.-Offenses-Prescribing Narcotics for Persons not Under 
Doctor's Treatment.-Purpose of Health & Saf. Code, § 11163, 
prohibiting a doctor from prescribing narcotics for one not 
under his treatment, is to regulate conduct of those persons 
who, in practice of their professions, have access to legitimate 
sources of narcotics, and not to protect persons who are not 
under a physician's treatment for a pathology from faulty 
diagnosis or improvident administration of narcotics. 
[7] !d.-Offenses-Prescribing Narcotics for Persous not Under 
Doctor's Treatment.-A doctor's conviction of violating Health 
& Saf. Code, § 11163, in prescribing narcotics for one not under 
his treatment must be affirmed, although it might reasonably 
be inferred from evidence either that he intended narcotics 
go to a person identified to him as sick wife of man before 
him or that it should go to such man, and although, despite 
man's assurances that he was not using drugs, doctor might 
have believed that he was the addict, since in either event gist 
of offense was doctor's action in writing prescription for nar-
cotics for person not under treatment for a pathology. 
[8] Criminal Law-Defenses-Entrapment.-Where doing of act 
is crime regardless of consent of anyone and criminal intent 
originates in mind of accused and offense is completed, the 
fact that officer furnishes accused an opportunity to commit 
the crime or aids him in its commission for purpose of secur-
ing evidence necessary to prosecute him constitutes no defense; 
there is no entrapment where officer uses no more persuasion 
than is necessary to ordinary sale and accused is ready and 
willing to make sale. 
[9] Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-It is not entrapment of a crim-
inal on which the law frowns, but seduction of innocent people 
into a criminal career by its officers. 
[10] Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-Where accused has preexisting 
criminal intent, fact that when solicited by decoy he committed 
crime raises no inference of unlawful entrapment. 
[lla, llb] Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-In prosecution of doctor 
for having sold narcotic prescriptions for use by person not 
under his treatment, a determination that doctor had not been 
entrapped into making sales is sustained by evidence that, 
[8] Entrapment to commit crime with view to punishment there-
for, notes, 18 A.L.R. 146, 66 A.L.R. 478, 86 A.L.R. 263. See, also, 
Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, § 36; AmJur., Criminal Law, § 335 et seq. 
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although man asking for prescriptions stated that his fictitious 
wife used "lots of different kinds" of medicine, it was doctor 
who suggested a prescription and it was he who first mentioned 
a narcotic; that doctor's suggestion of "T .B." came after initial 
prescription had been written and without any previous de-
scription by man of wife's illness; that despite lack of any 
suggestion by man that drugs were to be used for improper 
purpose, doctor advised him to wait sufficient time between 
prescriptions to avoid detection; and that, when placed under 
arrest, doctor stated that he had been selling prescriptions 
because he was in financial straits and needed money. 
[12] Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-Entrapment is a positive de-
fense imposing on accused the burden of showing that he was 
induced to commit act for which he is on trial. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. 
Kenneth C. Newell, Judge. Affirmed. 
Prosecution of doctor for violations of Health & Saf. Code, 
§ 11163, in issuance of narcotic prescriptions for one not under 
his treatment. Judgment of conviction affirmed. 
Isaac Pacht, Arthur F. Larrabee and Rudolph Pacht for 
Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Michael J. 
Clemens, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
EDMONDS, J.-Raymond M. Braddock was tried by the 
court without a jury upon an information charging him with 
four violations of section 11163 of the Health and Safety 
Code.* He has appealed from a judgment of conviction upon 
each count and from an order denying his motion for a new 
trial. Braddock asserts that a material variance exists be-
tween the information and the proof. Another point relied 
upon by him is that the evidence, as a matter of law, shows 
the commission of the offenses as a result of entrapment. 
The four counts are in substantially the same language, 
except for the date of the alleged offense. Each of them 
*Section 11163 provides: "Except in the regular practice of his pro· 
fession, no person shall prescribe, administer, or furnish, a narcotic to 
or for any person who is not under his treatment for a pathology or 
condition other than narcotic addiction, except as provided in this 
.division.'' 
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charges that Braddock, a licensed doctor of osteopathy, "did 
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prescribe a narcotic, 
to wit, methadon, to E. J. Mantler, a person not under his 
treatment for a pathology." Mantler, an inspector for the 
Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement, was the principal witness 
for the People. The defendant did not testify and presented 
no evidence. 
The record shows the following facts : 
In the company of one Grimes, a person addicted to the 
use of narcotics, Mantler went to Braddock's residence and 
was introduced to the doctor as "Roy Bates." Mantler 
said to him, ''I was hoping you could help me out with my 
wife." Braddock asked, "What kind of medicine does your 
wife use 1 '' Mantler replied, ''Well, she has used lots of 
different kinds in the last couple of years." .Asked if he 
could bring her to the doctor, Mantler stated that it would 
not be convenient or practical. They discussed other subjects 
for a few minutes, and then the doctor said, "Oh, well, let's 
go inside and I'll write her one." 
The three men entered the house, where Braddock seated 
himself at a table and produced a prescription book. .At 
that moment, one Thomas, known by Mantler to be a narcotic 
addict, appeared at the front door. Grimes left the room 
and engaged Thomas in conversation, and they disappeared 
from Mantler's view. Braddock asked Mantler for his wife's 
name and was given the fictitious one of "Julia M. Bates." 
"You say she used methadon?" Braddock asked. Mantler 
answered, "Yes, and demerol." Braddock said, "I think 
methadon is better.'' 
Told by Mantler that "shots" were preferable to tablets, 
the doctor wrote a prescription for 120 cubic centimeters 
of methadon to .Julia M. Bates at a fictitious address supplied 
by Mantler. "She has T. B. 1" he asked. Receiving an 
affirmative reply, he wrote those initials upon the prescrip-
tion form. ''How much do you want for the favor?'' asked 
Mantler. Braddock replied, "How much have you got?" 
Mantler told him that he had $30. Braddock said, "I will 
take half of it. That will give you enough to get along on." 
Mantler gave him the money and departed. 
Mantler had the prescription filled, although with difficulty 
because of the quantity of the drug indicated. When he 
received the substance, he gave it to a chemist for analysis. 
Testifying as an expert, the chemist stated that methadon 
is a manufacturer's name for ami done, a narcotic enumerated 
798 PEOPLE v. BRADDOCK [41 C.2d 
in section 11001 of the Health and Safety Code, and included 
within the provisions of section 11163 . 
.About 10 days later, Mantler again visited Braddock's 
home. .After some preliminary conversation, he remarked, 
"My wife is not too good." Braddock said, "What was it 
she is using, delaudid?" Mantler stated that it was metha-
don. The doctor said, ''That is not as bad as some stuff.'' 
He left the room and returned with a prescription book. 
"Give me a run down on her again. I can't seem to remember 
it." Mantler answered, "Well, she has been using it a 
couple of years now." "Is she bad when she doesn't have 
it?'' asked the doctor. ''She sure is,'' Mantler replied. 
''She nearly runs me up the chimney.'' 
Braddock made the notation, '' T. B.'' on the prescription 
form and asked Mantler what else was wrong with his wife. 
Mantler told him that she had an "old hysterectomy." The 
doctor said, '' Oh yes. How much of these are you using?'' 
Mantler looked at Braddock and said, "Not me, Doc. I am 
not using any. I have got enough trouble." Braddock re-
marked, ''I never use anything but alcohol. Morphine makes 
me very odd." He then stated, "We won't have any trouble 
as long as you keep this far apart.'' Mantler assured him 
that he would try to do so. In payment, the doctor accepted 
$10, and said, "I ought to see this patient some time." .After 
further conversation, he continued, "Give me a call some time 
when you are sure your wife will be home and I will drop in. 
I should see the patient.'' 
.About a week later, Mantler visited the doctor's home for 
the third time. He entered the house and was invited to 
sit down. .After writing a prescription to Julia M. Bates 
for a quantity of methadon, he said, "You are kind of short-
ening up the time." Mantler replied, "Well, Doc, it is not 
holding. It doesn't last." The doctor said, "I don't want 
you to come here before ten days.'' He again advised Mantler 
to wait 10 days, and accepted $10 for the prescription. 
On his fourth visit, Mantler was accompanied by inspectors 
from the Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement and from the Board 
of Osteopathic Examiners. The other men waited outside. 
Producing a prescription book, the doctor asked him the date 
and how he was getting along. Mantler answered that things 
were ''pretty tough'' and that he was having trouble ''getting 
along with it." He paid the doctor $10 after receiving the 
assurance that, if the prescriptions were kept at least 10 
days apart, they would have no trouble. 
Dec.1953] PEOPLE v. BRADDOCK 
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As he left the house, Mantler handed the prescription to 
Blanchard, one of the other officers. Blanchard entered, 
identified himself, and asked to see Braddock's records. When 
he questioned Braddock as to the identity of Julia Bates he 
was told that she was an old patient who had a post pregnancy 
condition and a hysterectomy. Braddock added that he had 
first contacted her when called to her home. Blanchard said, 
"Now, as a matter of fact, Doctor, have you ever seen Julia 
Bates?" The doctor admitted that he had not. 
Blanchard told Braddock that the person who had been 
obtaining prescriptions from him under the name of Julia 
Bates in fact was an inspector from the Bureau of Narcotic 
Enforcement. He asked the doctor why he had been writing 
false and fictitious prescriptions and was told, "Well, I am 
in financial straits and I need the money." "Do you 
admit then that you h4tve been violating the State and Federal 
Narcotic Laws in the sale of these narcotics 1 '' he asked. 
Braddock replied, ''Certainly, you have got the evidence on 
me; what is the use of denying it?" Thereafter, Mantler 
returned to the house, identified himself to the doctor, and 
showed him his credentials. 
Braddock's claim of a material variance is based upon au 
alleged conflict between the information, which charges that 
he prescribed narcotics to E. J. Mantler in violation of 
section 11163 of the Health and Safety Code, and the evi-
dence, which shows that the prescriptions were made out to 
Julia M. Bates, a fictitious person. 
[1] An information is formally sufficient if, in substance, 
it charges the defendant with the commission of a public 
offense in words "sufficient to give the accused notice of 
the offense of which he is accused." (Pen. Code, § 952.) 
[2] To be material, a variance between the information and 
proof must be ''of such a substantive character as to mislead 
the accused in preparing his defense, or . . . likely to place 
him in second jeopardy for the same offense. '' (People v. 
Williams, 27 Cal.2d 220, 226 [163 P.2d 692]; People v. Amy, 
100 Cal.App.2d 126, 127 [223 P.2d 69]; People v. Moranda, 
87 Cal.App.2d 703, 705 [197 P .2d 394].) 
[3] In substance, the charges against Braddock are based 
upon transactions by which he sold narcotic prescriptions to 
M:antler, ostensibly for the use of another person, neither of 
them being under his treatment for a pathology. The true 
identity of the man supposed to be the husband of Julia M. 
Bates was made known to Braddock both by Inspector Blan-
800 PEOPLE v. BRADDOCK [41 C.2d 
chard and by Mantler himself, and Braddock was present 
when Mantler testified at the preliminary hearing. That 
testimony included in detail the circumstances surrounding 
the writing of the prescriptions, with the dates and places 
of those events and the names used, and it was sufficient to 
notify him of the particular circumstances of the offense 
charged in the information. (People v. Roberts, 40 Cal.2d 
483, 486 [254 P.2d 501] .) Furthermore, by stipulation the 
evidence against Braddock was presented by a transcript of 
the proceedings upon the preliminary hearing with only a 
slight amount of additional testimony. Braddock could not 
have been misled. 
[4] If Braddock should be tried again on a charge of 
violating section 11163 for any of the acts which form the 
bases for the present prosecution, he may show former jeop-
ardy by evidence produced in that pr~ceeding. "It is well 
settled that on a plea of double jeopardy, extrinsic evidence 
is admissible on the trial to identify the crime of which the 
defendant has been convicted." (People v. Williams, supra, 
27 Cal.2d at p. 226.) 
Braddock contends, however, that the evidence does not 
support the charge that he violated section 11163 of the Health 
and Safety Code, in that the narcotics were prescribed for 
a fictitious person. Although the evidence shows a violation 
of section 11165 of that code,* a misdemeanor, the argument 
continues, a violation of section 11163, which is a felony, 
requires that he "prescribe, administer, or furnish" the 
narcotic to an existing person. 
[5] It is questionable whether an accused properly may 
be convicted of a violation of section 11165 when the evidence 
does not show that he knew, or should have known, that the 
person for whom a prescription is written is nonexistent. 
But even if punishable under that section, it does not follow 
that such act may not also amount to a violation of section 
11163. To hold otherwise would be to permit a physician 
freely supplying narcotics for illegitimate purposes to prevent 
being convicted of a felony by the simple device of writing 
a prescription for a fictitious person. No such result could 
have been intended by the Legislature. 
The decision in People v. Whitlow, 113 Cal.App.2d 804 
[249 P.2d 35], is not contrary to this conclusion. In that 
case, the defendant was accused of v~olating section 11163, 
*Section 11165 states: "No person shall issue a prescription that is 
false or fictitious in any respect." 
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but upon motion the offenses charged were reduced to mis-
demeanors under section 11165 as lesser included offenses. 
Upon appeal, the judgment of conviction was reversed upon 
the ground that a violation of section 11163 does not neces-
sarily include a violation of section 11165. However, the 
court did not hold that conduct proscribed by the former sec-
tion may never be included within the prohibitions of the 
latter one. 
[6] The apparent purpose of section 11163 is to regulate 
the conduct of those persons who, in the practice of their 
professions, have access to legitimate sources of narcotics. 
The responsibility of such a practitioner is to prescribe nar-
cotics for legitimate medical purposes. (Health & Sa£. Code, 
§ 11162.5.) ''A physician may prescribe for, furnish to, or 
administer narcotics to his patient when the patient is suf-
fering from a disease, ailment, injury, or infirmities attendant 
upon old age, other than narcotic addiction. 
''The physician shall prescribe, furnish, or administer 
narcotics only when in good faith he believes the disease, 
ailment, injury, or infirmity, requires such treatment." 
(Health & Sa£. Code, § 11330.) 
If the object of section 11163 were to protect persons not 
under a physician's treatment for a pathology from faulty 
diagnosis or improvident administration of narcotics, it might 
be material in a prosecution under that section to show 
whether the person named in the prescription exists. But 
that is not the purpose of the statute. It seeks instead to 
prevent one having access to narcotics from making them 
available, other than for a legitimate purpose, to one under 
treatment for a pathology. 
[7] From the evidence it might reasonably be inferred 
that Braddock intended that the narcotics go to the person 
identified to him as Julia M. Bates. Also tenable is the infer-
ence of his intention that the narcotics be used by Mantler. 
Despite Mantler 's assurances that he was not using the drugs, 
Braddock might have believed that he was the addict, as 
shown by his references to Mantler 's "shortening up the 
time'' between prescriptions and his advice to avoid more 
dangerous d:·ugs. In either event, however, the conviction 
must be affirmed, since the gist of the offense was Braddock's 
action in writing a prescription for a narcotic for a person 
not under treatment for a pathology. 
41 C.2d-26 
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Finally, Braddock contends that the evidence, as a matter 
of law, shows unlawful entrapment. From the testimony 
of Mantler, he argues, it appears that the sales of prescriptions 
were made by him as the result of Mantler 's inducements. 
The crime originated in the mind of Mantler, says Braddock, 
and except for the officer's persuasion, fraud and trickery, 
the offenses would not have been committed. 
[8] The many decisions in this state which define the 
defense of entrapment were reviewed in People v. Lindsey, 
91 Cal.App.2d 914 [205 P.2d 1114], and the law stated as 
follows : ''Where the doing of an act is a crime, regardless 
of the consent of anyone, the courts are agreed that if the 
criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and 
the offense is completed, the fact that an opportunity was 
furnished, or that the accused is aided in the commission 
of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to 
prosecute him therefor, constitutes no defense. (Citations.) 
If the officer uses no more persuasion than is necessary to 
an ordinary sale, and the accused is ready and willing to 
make the sale, there is no entrapment." (P. 917.) [9] More 
recently it was held: "It is not the entrapment of a criminal 
upon which the law frowns, but the seduction of innocent 
people into a criminal career by its officers is what is con-
demned and will not be tolerated. [10] Where an accused 
has a preexisting criminal intent, the fact that when solicited 
by a decoy he committed a crime raises no inference of 
unlawful entrapment." (People v. Schwartz, 109 Cal.App. 
2d 450, 455 [240 P.2d 1024]; quoted with approval in People 
Y. Roberts, supra, at p. 489; accord People v. Makovsky, 
3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [ 44 P.2d 536] ; People v. Branch, 119 
Cal.App.2d 490, 494 [260 P.2d 27] ; People v. Alamillo, 113 
Cal.App.2d 617, 620-621 [248 P.2d 421]; People v. Craw-
ford, 105 Cal.App.2d 530, 537 [234 P.2d 181] .) 
[lla] In the present case, although Mantler had stated 
that his fictitious wife used "lots of different kinds" of medi-
cines, it was Braddock who suggested a prescription, and it was 
he who first mentioned a narcotic. Braddock's suggestion 
of "T .B." came after the initial prescription had been written 
and without any previous description by Mantler of the 
nature of his wife's illnesses. Despite the complete lack of 
any suggestion by Mantler that the drugs were to be used 
for an improper purpose, Braddock advised him to wait a 
sufficient time between prescriptions to avoid detection. 
Moreover, when placed under arrest, Braddock stated that 
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he had been selling prescriptions because he was in :financial 
straits and needed the money. 
[12] Entrapment ''is a positive defense imposing upon 
an accused the burden of showing that he was induced to 
commit the act for which he is on trial" (People v. Schwartz, 
sttpra, at p. 455; People v. Grijalva, 48 Cal.App.2d 690, 694 
[121 P.2d 32]; People v. Lee, 9 Cal.App.2d 99, 109 [48 P.2d 
1003)). Where the record shows a conflict in the evidence, 
the judgment will not be reversed. (People v. Crawford, 105 
Cal.App.2d 530, 537 [234 P.2d 181].) 
Braddock concedes that if the officer had asked to purchase 
a narcotic prescription for an unlawful purpose, there would 
be no basis for a defense of entrapment. He argues, however, 
that because Mantler made the purchases for a person sup-
posedly ill, it must be concluded that the seller was persuaded 
to violate the law only because of sympathy. However, a 
person who violates the law by selling narcotics to an evasive 
purchaser is as guilty as one who supplies an addict more 
forthright in his demands. That Braddock was not misled 
is demonstrated by his studied efforts, entirely voluntary, 
to give a cloak of legality to the transaction. 
[llb] The testimony, read as a whole, shows Braddock to 
have been a willing seller to whom Mantler presented an 
opportunity to sell narcotics. By the judgment of conviction 
and the order denying the motion for a new trial, the trial 
judge determined that Braddock had not been entrapped 
into making the sales. For an appellate court to hold other-
wise would require it to draw different inferences from the 
evidence which amply supports that determination. 
The judgment and the order denying defendant's motion 
for a new trial are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I adopt as my dissent in this case the able 
and well reasoned opinion prepared by Mr. Presiding Justice 
Shinn which was concurred in by Justices Wood and Vallee 
when this case was before the District Court of Appeal, 
Second Appellate District, Division Three. 
"Dr. Raymond M. Bradilock was convicted in a nonjury 
trial of four violations of section 11163, Health and Safety 
804 PEOPLE V. BRADDOCK [41 C.2d 
Code, 1 consisting of the issuance of four narcotic prescriptions 
on separate days for one who was not under his treatment. 
He was granted probation upon condition that he spend nine 
months in the county jail, his motion for a new trial was 
denied, and he appeals. 
''The case was tried upon the transcript of evidence at 
the preliminary and some additional testimony at the time 
of trial. The case of the People rested upon the testimony 
of one Mantler, an inspector for the Bureau of Narcotic 
Enforcement, State of California. Defendant offered no 
evidence. Therefore, the evidence is unconflicting. 
''Defendant urges the defense of entrapment and also 
claims there was a material variance in that the information 
charged that the medicine was prescribed to E. J. Mantler, 
whereas the proof showed that it was prescribed for a ficti-
tious person, 'Julia Bates.' 
''Simply stated, the rule as to entrapment is that the 
defense is valid when the intent to bring about the commis-
sion of the unlawful act originates in the mind of the entrap-
ping person and the accused is lured into commission of an 
offense he would not otherwise have committed in order that 
he can be apprehended and prosecuted. (People v. Hall, 
133 Cal..App. 40 [23 P.2d 783].) 
"Mantler had himself introduced to Dr. Braddock by one 
Donald Grimes who, he testified, was a narcotic addict whom 
he had known for about a year. (There was no evidence that 
Grimes was known to the doctor to be a narcotic addict.) 
Grimes took Mantler to Dr. Braddock's residence and intro-
duced him to the doctor as 'Roy Bates.' Mantler said he 
hoped the doctor would take care of his wife, to whom he 
gave the fictitious name of 'Julia M. Bates,' and he gave 
a false address for her. The doctor said he was supposed 
to see the patient and asked if she could be brought to him. 
The doctor asked what kind of medicine she used and Mantler 
said she had used all different kinds in the past two 
years. After a conversation about the doctor's dog and his 
cat, they entered the doctor's house and the doctor asked 
what it was Mantler wanted, whether his wife used Metha-
don and Mantler replied mostly Methadon or Demerol. A 
prescription was written and Mantler paid the doctor $15. 
1
'' '§ 11163. Narcotic not to be prescribed etc., for person not under 
treatment. Except in the regular practice of his profession, no person 
shall prescribe, administer, or furnish, a narcotic to or for any person 
who is not under his treatment for a pathology or condition other than 
narcotic addiction, except as provided in this division.' '' 
Dec.1953] PEOPLE v. BRADDOCK 
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During this time a man named Thomas came to the front 
door and Grimes went outside and spoke with him. lYiantler 
testified Thomas was a narcotic addict in Los Angeles, but 
there was no evidence that the doctor was aware of that fact 
or even knew of the appearance of Thomas. Ten days later 
lYiantler returned. He and the doctor visited in a friendly 
manner and in the conversation lYiantler said he had been 
lucky in an unlawful poker game. He said his wife was not 
'doing so good,' that she had run out of medicine but he 
had something for an emergency. The doctor asked if his 
wife gave trouble when she was short of medicine and lYiantler 
said: 'She very nearly ran me up the chimney of the house 
on occasions.' The doctor wrote on his prescription book, 
'T .B.' and said : 'What else is wrong with her, I have for-
gotten what you said the last time' and lYiantler said: 'Well, 
she had an old hysterectomy a couple of years ago.' lYiantler 
paid the doctor $10. About ten days later he went to the 
doctor again, and on another visit ten days later, when the 
doctor asked how he was getting along, lYiantler told him 
that things were 'pretty tough.' Although l\tiantler testified 
that on the first occasion he did not tell the doctor what was 
wrong with his wife, it appeared from his cross examination 
that he had stated that she had 'T.B.' During the several 
visits the conversations were on a friendly basis and the 
doctor addressed lYiantler as 'Roy.' Upon the second visit 
he asked l\'Iantler to let him know when he could call upon 
'Julia Bates' at her home, and upon different occasions 
inquired how she was getting on. On one occasion they 
watched a world series ball game on television, and upon 
the occasion of the second visit lYiantler offered the doctor 
$20, but he refused to take more than $10. After lYiantler 
obtained the first prescription it was known to other inspectors 
in the enforcement office that he had obtained it by false 
representations to the doctor that 'Julia Bates' was his wife 
al).d was in need of drugs. Upon lYiantler's fourth visit 
defendant was arrested by lYiantler and three other inspectors 
who seized all his prescription books and records. 
''The only question which requires an answer may be 
stated as follows : When a narcotic officer conceives a plan 
to entrap a physician into a violation of the law, has himself 
introduced to the physician under an assumed name, repre-
sents that he has a sick wife who is using Methadon or 
Demerol (trade names), makes excuses for not bringing her 
to the doctor's office when told he should do so, ignores a 
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request by the doctor that he call upon her, and obtains 
prescriptions in a fictitious name given as that of his wife, 
may the doctor be lawfully convicted of violation of the 
law which forbids prescribing a narcotic for one not under 
his treatment? The question describes the case of Dr. Brad-
dock and our answer is a negative. 
"It is scarcely necessary to remark that the agent won 
the confidence of the doctor, who was soon calling him 'Roy' 
and making friendly inquiries concerning the supposed wife. 
He appeared as a man who was burdened with a sick wife, 
for whom he generously provided the drugs for the relief 
of her distress, when she was unable to visit the doctor. So 
the doctor issued the prescriptions for one not under his 
treatment, and as a consequence stands convicted of four 
counts of felony. But let us see what the agent did: He 
conceived the plan of inducing the doctor to commit a crime; 
he persuaded the doctor to issue false and fraudulent prescrip-
tions and became accessory to four misdemeanors ( § 11165) 2 ; 
he made false and fraudulent representations, a felony under 
section 111703 ; he gave a false name and a false address for the 
pretended wife, a felony under section 11170.54 • This was en-
trapment. In all our searching we have not found a case in 
which a physician was made the victim of such deception. We 
cannot say that this is the first time a presumably law-abiding 
physician has been induced by false representations of a law 
enforcement officer to issue a prescription unlawfully, although 
we have been unable to discover another one. This satisfied 
us not only that such methods have not been found necessary 
in policing the medical profession in prescribing narcotics, 
but also that the employment of fraud and deception in the 
2
'' '§ 11165. False or fictitious prescription. No person shall issue 
a prescription that is false or fictitious in any respect.' '' 
3
" '§ 11170. Acts and statements prohibited. (1) No person shall 
obtain or attempt to obtain narcotics, or procure or attempt to procure 
the administration of or prescription for narcotics, (a) by fraud, deceit, 
misrepresentation, or subterfuge; or (b) by the concealment of a nia· 
terial fact. 
" '(2) No person shall make a false statement in any prescriptio:tJ,, 
order, report, or record, required by this division. 
" '(3) No person shall, for the purpose of obtaining narcotics, falsely 
assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, whole· 
saler, pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized 
person. 
" ' ( 4) No person shall affix any false or forged label to a package or 
receptacle containing narcotics.' '' 
•« '§ 11170.5. False name and address. No person shall, in connection 
with the prescribing, furnishing, administering, or dispensing of a 
narcotic, give a false name or false address.' '' 
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entrapment of physicians has been very generally and prop-
erly scorned. 
''There is, of course, much more involved here than the 
simple question whether Dr. Braddock violated the law. He 
stood mute, as was his right, and thus admitted the truth 
of Mantler's testimony. It is not because of a claim of 
innocence that he relies upon the defense of entrapment, 
but because it is the policy of the law not to punish violations 
initiated and induced by others for the purpose of bringing 
about a prosecution. 
''If we were to uphold the conviction of Dr. Braddock it 
would mean that we were approving the unlawful enforce-
ment of the law and giving a free hand to law enforcement 
officers to use not only deceitful means, but unlawful means, 
to entice physicians, and others as well, to violate the law. 
The courts have consistently refused to temporize with such 
fraud, deceit and direct violation of statutory law as the 
record here discloses. The agent provocateur, so despised 
that he has been given no name in our language and can 
claim no place in our society, had best have the door shut 
against him whenever he appears. Our courts have given 
no encouragement to his hateful practices, no foothold in 
our field of law enforcement from which to extend his con-
taminating influence. 
"It was said in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 [53 
S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413, 418, 26 A.L.R. 249]: 'The Federal 
courts have generally approved the statement of Circuit 
Judge Sanborn in the leading case of B1dts v. United States 
( C.C.A. 8th) 18 A.L.R. 143, 273 Fed. 38, supra, as follows: 
''The first duties of the officers of the law are to prevent, 
not to punish crime. It is not their duty to incite to and 
create crime for the sole purpose of prosecuting and punish-
ing it. Here the evidence strongly tends to prove, if it does 
not conclusively do so, that their first and chief endeavor 
was to cause, to create, crime in order to punish it, and it 
is unconscionable, contrary to public policy, and to the estab-
lished law of the land to punish a man for the commission 
of an offense of the like of which he had never been guilty, 
either in thought or in deed, and evidently never would 
have been guilty of if the officers of the law had not inspired, 
incited, persuaded, and lured him to attempt to commit it," ' 
and in the concurring opinion of Justices Roberts, Brandeis 
and Stone : 'There is common agreement that where a law 
officer envisages a crime, plans it, and activates its com-
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mission by one not theretofore intending its perpetration, for 
the sole purpose of obtaining a victim through indictment, 
conviction and sentence, the consummation of so revolting a 
plan ought not to be permitted by any self-respecting tribunal. 
Equally true is this whether the offense is one at common 
law or merely a creature of statute. Public policy forbids 
such sacrifice of decency. The enforcement of this policy 
calls upon the court, in every instance where alleged entrap-
ment of a defendant is brought to its notice, to ascertain the 
facts, to appraise their effect upon the administration of 
justice, and to make such order with respect to the further 
prosecution of the cause as the circumstances require. . . . 
" 'The doctrine rests, rather, on a fundamental rule of 
public policy. The protection of its own functions and the 
preservation of the purity of its own temple belongs only to 
the court. It is the province of the court and of the court 
alone to protect itself and the government from such prosti-
tution of the criminal law. The violation of the principles 
of justice by the entrapment of the unwary into crime should 
be dealt with by the court no matter by whom or at what. 
stage of the proceedings the facts are brought to its attention. 
Quite properly it may discharge the prisoner upon a writ of 
habeas corpus. Equally well it may quash the indictment 
or entertain and try a plea in bar. But its powers do not 
end there. Proof of entrapment, at any stage of the case, 
requires the court to stop the prosecution, direct that the 
indictment be quashed, and the defendant set at liberty. If 
in doubt as to the facts it may submit the issue of entrapment 
to a jury for advice. But whatever may be the finding upon 
such submission the power and the duty to act remain with 
the court and not with the jury.' 
"It has been the settled policy of the courts to condemn 
and repudiate unlawful enforcement of the law. We shall 
refer to only a few of the many cases. One in which the 
accused was entrapped into procuring and selling a narcotic 
is Cline v. United States, 20 F.2d 494 (Eighth Circuit). A 
government narcotic agent arrested an addict but promised 
to release him if he 'made a case' for the agent. The addict, 
pretending to be greatly in need of the drug, persuaded a 
friend to induce a chauffeur to obtain morphine for him. The 
friend received the morphine from the chauffeur, paid him 
$5 and when he delivered the morphine to the addict in 
exchange for $5, was arrested and convicted in a jury trial. 
It was held on appeal that the evidence sustained only one 
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conclusion, namely, that the agent used the addict to trap 
the defendant. 
"In United States v. Healy, 202 F. 349 (District Court, 
Montana) the accused unlawfully sold liquor to an Indian 
who was not known by him to be such, but who was used by 
government officers as a decoy. After conviction the judg-
ment was set aside, the court saying: 'Though the seller has 
violated the statute, he was the passive instrument of the 
government, and his is a blameless wrong for which he cannot 
be justly convicted .... The practice cannot be tolerated, 
and a conviction for an offense so procured cannot stand.' 
"In United States v. Ernan Mfg. Co., 271 F. 353 (District 
Court, Colorado), a government agent wrote the defendant 
enclosing $3 and requesting a case of a preparation claimed 
to be mislabeled. His purpose was to initiate a prosecution 
for an unlawful shipment in interstate commerce. Defendant, 
having made the shipment, was prosecuted and it was held, 
on the stipulated facts, 'that in the interests of a sound public 
policy the defendant should be found not guilty and dis-
charged.' 
"In United States v. Lynch, 256 F. 983, (District Court, 
New York) the Military Intelligence Department caused one 
Fancher to demand money for his influence in the award of 
a government contract and when money was offered to him 
by the defendant Lynch the latter was arrested and prosecuted 
for offering a bribe. The court said that under such circum-
stances the government was estopped from prosecuting on 
the ground that it caused and created that of which complaint 
was made. A verdict of acquittal was directed. 
"In United States v. Echols, 253 F. 862 (District Court, 
Texas), a military police officer persuaded the accused to 
procure him a drink in order that he might arrest him therefor. 
The prosecution was dismissed although the defendant had 
offered to plead guilty. The court upheld the defense of 
entrapment and stated as follows (p. 863): 'In what is here 
stated there is no intention to excuse persons who yield to 
temptation, or to hamper or limit the acts of officers of the 
law in detecting crime by any means or device; but the zeal 
to detect crime ought not to be so vigorous as to induce officers 
to originate and procure the commission of the very offenses 
which they are enjoined to prevent. No faithful officer of 
the law will be hampered, nor will any criminal be aided, 
by the observance of this rule. Its disregard, however, may, 
and likely will, subject to persecution and conviction weak 
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and spineless persons; who find it hard to resist temptation; 
and the government, through the zeal for conviction on the 
part of the arresting officer, may become the means of the ruin 
of its citizens, instead of their safeguard and protection. 
Such a possible result at once establishes the unimpeachable 
wisdom of the rule of public policy here enunciated, and re-
quires that the plea of guilty, which the defendant offered 
to make, be by the court refused, and the case dismissed, which 
is accordingly now done.' 
"United States v. Mathues, 22 F.2d 979 (District Court, 
Pennslyvania), was a similar case which stated and applied 
the rule of entrapment. 
''The People contend that the case is the ordinary one 
of an officer appearing as a willing buyer of narcotics from 
one who is willing to sell to anyone offering himself as a 
customer. Cases of this sort are legion, conviction are the 
rule and reversals the rare exception. (People v. Makovsky, 
3 Cal.2d 366, 369 [ 44 P.2d 536] ; People v. Lindsey, 91 Cal. 
App.2d 914, 916 [205 P.2d 1114]; cf. People v. Gallagher, 107 
Cal.App. 425 [290 P. 504] ; Cline v. United States, supra, 20 
F.2d 494.) But this is because one who is willing to peddle 
narcotics is necessarily a criminal at heart, looking for no 
inducement to break the law other than the money he expects 
to receive. It is an inescapable inference in such cases that 
a willingness to violate the law existed and that the act of 
violation was self induced. Persuasion to make a sale does 
not taint the transaction with the vice of entrapment unless 
it induces the commission of an act that would otherwise not 
have been committed. (People v. Makovsky, supra, 3 Cal.2d 
366, 370; cf. Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35 (Eighth Cir-
cuit 1921); People v. Gallagher, supra, 107 Cal.App. 425.) If 
this were such a case it would occupy but little of our time, for 
we would applaud and encourage every energetic and legiti-
mate effort to stamp out the fearful and detestable traffic 
in narcotics. 
"In Sam Yick v. United States (C.C.A. 9), 240 F. 60 [153 
C.C.A. 96], at p. 65, the court stated: 'While it may be true 
that the mere aiding of one in the commission of a criminal 
act by a government officer or agent does not preclude the 
conviction of the party committing the crime, yet where the 
officers of the law have incited the party to commit the crime 
charged and lured him on to its consummation, the law will 
not authorize a verdict of guilty.' It is, of course, conceded 
that officer Mantler conceived the plan to induce Dr. Braddock 
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to commit a crime. The remaining question is whether, in the 
language of the Sam Yick case, the officer 'lured him on to its 
consummation,' and we shall see from a discussion of the 
undisputed evidence that Dr. Braddock was 'lured on' from 
start to finish. 
''The question here is whether it could reasonably have been 
inferred from the facts in evidence that Dr. Braddock was 
willing to write prescriptions for anyone willing to pay a 
price, and that he was not induced and persuaded to write 
them by the representations of the officer. Such conclusions, 
in our opinion, would have been based on nothing more than 
suspicion. Mantler kept up his deception to the last. Nothing 
occurred to cast doubt upon his representations. The doctor 
asked to see 'Julia Bates' at his office and offered to call 
upon her at her home, but Mantler succeeded in persuading 
him that she could not be brought to the office and avoided 
the suggestion that the doctor call upon her. It was not 
shown that Dr. Braddock had ever before issued a prescription 
for a person who was not under treatment by him, or had 
otherwise violated the narcotic law. Mantler made no effort 
to obtain a prescription for himself. He evidently believed 
deception would be necessary and he played his role straight 
through. He was the agent of the state through whom the 
state acted. It should not be permitted the state to escape 
responsibility for the acts of its agent by merely saying that 
although he spoke falsely he was not believed, and that the 
doctor was not deceived by his falsehoods into doing some-
thing he would not otherwise have done. Every reasonable 
inference is to the contrary. That the do.ctor believed the 
representations was evidenced by the fact that he acted upon 
them. That they were understood by Mantler to be the effec-
tive means of accomplishing his purpose was evidenced by the 
fact that he persisted in them and improved upon them to 
the point of arousing the doctor's compassion. If there was 
an intermixture of cupidity, this would not alter the legal 
aspects of the case. There is no pretense that the defendant 
was moved by purely charitable motives, or that he did not 
know he was violating the law, but this does not militate 
against the defense of entrapment. Defendant admitted to the 
officers, immediately after his arrest, that he had written the 
prescriptions because he needed the money, but this means 
only that he was the more easily persuaded. The defense of 
entrapment is not to be denied to the weak and needy. They 
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are the very ones who become the victims of persuasion and 
deceit, and who deserve protection. 
''Defendant claims only that he was persuaded to violate 
the law and that the evidence supports his claim to the ex-
clusion of any other reasonable conclusion. In answering this 
contention the People call attention to the testimony of 
Mantler that he had previously questioned defendant over the 
telephone and accused him of prescribing for addicts, which 
accusation defendant resented. Also, mention is made of 
the fact that Mantler testified that Grimes and Thomas were 
addicts, although it was not shown that defendant had knowl-
edge of that fact or that he even knew the man Thomas. To 
give serious consideration to such self serving testimony and 
vaguely suspicious circumstances as incriminating evidence 
would only magnify the error of the conviction. The mere 
presence of Grimes and Thomas was not any sort of evidence 
that defendant was a law violator. If they were 'planted' 
there by Mantler, as they no doubt were, they could have been 
called as witnesses if they would have testified that defendant 
had prescribed for them unlawfully. It is therefore to be 
presumed that had they been called to testify as to their 
relations with defendants, if any, their testimony would have 
been adverse to the People. We therefore utterly reject the 
argument that as against this presumption the court could 
regard the presence of these men as an incriminating or even 
a suspicious circumstance. Moreover, the officers had seized 
and had possession of defendant's narcotic records. None was 
offered in evidence. The assertion of Mantler in the tele-
phone conversation that defendant had been prescribing for 
addicts was not ·evidence. Defendant made no admission. 
His prescription books, which were required to contain copies 
of all prescriptions issued within two years (Health & Saf. 
Code, § 11166.10), were in the hands of the officers. It was 
to be presumed that if they had been produced in court they 
would not have disclosed anything favorable to the prosecu-
tion. 
''This case takes on added significance from the fact that 
in the present day courts and juries must place great reliance 
upon the testimony of officers who are charged with the duty 
of enforcing the narcotic laws. It is of common occurrence 
that convictions are had, and are affirmed on appeal, upon 
the uncorroborated testimony of such officers, even in the face 
of strong denials by the accused. We do not doubt that con-
fidence in the veracity and motives of the officers is generally 
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well deserved, and deem it somewhat more than unfortunate 
that any officer should stoop to falsehood and deceit in order 
to bring about the commission of a crime for the purpose of 
obtaining a conviction. It is shocking to learn that an officer 
of the law whose worth depends so much upon a high regard 
for the truth and a just regard for the rights of citizens 
should conceive and carry out a plan involving so much 
duplicity, and even more so that he should be assisted by 
other officers who were aware of the deception. That the 
narcotic laws are vigorously and systematically enforced we 
know from the multitudes of arrests that are made and the 
convictions that are had, but it is better that some offenders 
should go unpunished than that overzealous officers should 
be permitted to indulge in practices which would tend to 
demoralize the law enforcement agencies and impair the 
confidence and trust of the people and the courts which 
it is necessary for such agencies to possess in order to be most 
effective. 
'"fhis is clearly a case in which there was an entire absence 
of evidence and reasonable inference that the accused would 
have violated the law had he not been induced to do so by 
false representations and persuasion of a law enforcement 
officer. We do not believe that any conviction has been sus-
tabled on appeal upon such a record. 
"In conclusion, we quote from Woo W ai v. United States, 
223 P. 412, 415 [137 C.C.A. 604] : 'Some of the courts have 
gone far in sustaining convictions of crimes induced by de-
tectives and by state officers. 'fhis is notably so of the deci-
sion in People v. Mills, 178 N.Y. 274 [70 N.E. 786, 67 L.R.A. 
131]. But it is to be said, by way of distinguishing such cases 
from the case at bar, that in all of those cases the criminal 
intention to commit the offense had its origin in the mind of 
the defendant.' 
"If the conviction of Dr. Braddock should be affirmed it 
would be the only case to be found in the books in which a 
conviction was allowed to stand upon undisputed evidence 
that an officer of the law conceived the commission of a crime, 
used misrepresentation, deceit and unlawful methods to induce 
its commission, and when all the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences were that but for the machinations of the officer 
the unlawful act would not have been committed. 
"It is unnecessary to consider the question of variance be-
tween the information and the proof. 
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''The judgment and order denying a new trial are reversed.'' 
For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion I would 
reverse the judgment. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January 
14, 1954. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
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[1] Gaming-Offenses-Evidence-Accomplices and Corroboration. 
-Where prosecution witnesses, according to their own testi-
mony, were principals in each of bookmaking offenses charged, 
one witness having directly committed acts constituting those 
offenses and other witness having advised and encouraged 
their commission (Pen. Code, § 30), they were accomplices 
whose testimony must be corroborated by other evidence tend-
ing to connect defendant with such offenses (Pen. Code, 
§ 1111). 
[2a, 2b] !d.-Offenses-Evidence-Accomplices and Corroboration. 
-Accomplice testimony of prosecution witnesses with refer-
ence to bookmaking offenses charged was corroborated by evi-
dence of defendant's association with police officials on one 
hand and with such prosecution witnesses on other hand, his 
peculiar explanation of his relations and dealings with the 
latter and his reason for receiving payments from them, his 
admitted knowledge that one prosecution witness was a book-
maker and his advice to him to abandon that enterprise, since 
such evidence tended to connect defendant with commission of 
bookmaking offenses. 
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